Asterisk
Project Security Advisory -
Product |
Asterisk |
Summary |
Media takeover in RTP stack |
Nature of Advisory |
Unauthorized data disclosure |
Susceptibility |
Remote Unauthenticated Sessions |
Severity |
Critical |
Exploits Known |
No |
Reported On |
May 17, 2017 |
Reported By |
Klaus-Peter Junghanns |
Posted On |
August 31, 2017 |
Last Updated On |
|
Advisory Contact |
Joshua Colp <jcolp AT digium DOT com> |
CVE Name |
CVE-2017-14099 |
Description |
The “strictrtp” option in rtp.conf enables a feature of the RTP stack that learns the source address of media for a session and drops any packets that do not originate from the expected address. This option is enabled by default in Asterisk 11 and above.
The “nat” and “rtp_symmetric” options for chan_sip and chan_pjsip respectively enable symmetric RTP support in the RTP stack. This uses the source address of incoming media as the target address of any sent media. This option is not enabled by default but is commonly enabled to handle devices behind NAT.
A change was made to the strict RTP support in the RTP stack to better tolerate late media when a reinvite occurs. When combined with the symmetric RTP support this introduced an avenue where media could be hijacked. Instead of only learning a new address when expected the new code allowed a new source address to be learned at all times.
If a flood of RTP traffic was received the strict RTP support would allow the new address to provide media and with symmetric RTP enabled outgoing traffic would be sent to this new address, allowing the media to be hijacked. Provided the attacker continued to send traffic they would continue to receive traffic as well. |
Resolution |
The RTP stack will now only learn a new source address if it has been told to expect the address to change. The RTCP support has now also been updated to drop RTCP reports that are not regarding the RTP session currently in progress. The strict RTP learning progress has also been improved to guard against a flood of RTP packets attempting to take over the media stream. |
Affected Versions |
||
Product |
Release Series |
|
Asterisk Open Source |
11.x |
11.4.0 |
Asterisk Open Source |
13.x |
All Releases |
Asterisk Open Source |
14.x |
All Releases |
Certified Asterisk |
11.6 |
All Releases |
Certified Asterisk |
13.13 |
All Releases |
Corrected In |
|
Product |
Release |
Asterisk Open Source |
11.25.2, 13.17.1, 14.6.1 |
Certified Asterisk |
11.6-cert17, 13.13-cert5 |
Patches |
|
SVN URL |
Revision |
http://downloads.asterisk.org/pub/security/AST-2017-005-11.diff |
Asterisk 11 |
http://downloads.asterisk.org/pub/security/AST-2017-005-13.diff |
Asterisk 13 |
http://downloads.asterisk.org/pub/security/AST-2017-005-14.diff |
Asterisk 14 |
http://downloads.asterisk.org/pub/security/AST-2017-005-11.6.diff |
Certified Asterisk 11.6 |
http://downloads.asterisk.org/pub/security/AST-2017-005-13.13.diff |
Certified Asterisk 13.13 |
Links |
https://issues.asterisk.org/jira/browse/ASTERISK-27013 |
Asterisk Project Security Advisories are posted at http://www.asterisk.org/security This document may be superseded by later
versions; if so, the latest version will be posted at
http://downloads.digium.com/pub/security/ |
Revision History |
||
Date |
Editor |
Revisions Made |
May 30, 2017 |
Joshua Colp |
Initial Revision |
August 31, 2017 |
Kevin Harwell |
Updated for CVE |
Asterisk
Project Security Advisory -
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