Asterisk Project Security Advisory - ASTERISK-2016-009

| Product | Asterisk |
|-----------------------|----------------------------------|
| Summary | Unathenticated calls in chan_sip |
| Nature of Advisory | Authentication Bypass |
| Susceptibility | Remote unauthenticated sessions |
| Severity | Minor |
| Exploits Known | No |
| Reported On | October 3, 2016 |
| Reported By | Walter Doekes |
| Posted On | December 8, 2016 |
| Last Updated On | December 13, 2016 |
| Advisory Contact | Mmichelson AT digium DOT com |
| CVE Name | CVE-2016-9938 |

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The chan_sip channel driver has a liberal definition for whitespace when attempting to strip the content between a SIP header name and a colon character. Rather than following RFC 3261 and stripping only spaces and horizontal tabs, Asterisk treats any non-printable ASCII character as if it were whitespace. This means that headers such as

Contact\x01:

will be seen as a valid Contact header.

This mostly does not pose a problem until Asterisk is placed in tandem with an authenticating SIP proxy. In such a case, a crafty combination of valid and invalid To headers can cause a proxy to allow an INVITE request into Asterisk without authentication since it believes the request is an in-dialog request. However, because of the bug described above, the request will look like an out-of-dialog request to Asterisk. Asterisk will then process the request as a new call. The result is that Asterisk can process calls from unvetted sources without any authentication.

If you do not use a proxy for authentication, then this issue does not affect you. If your proxy is dialog-aware (meaning that the proxy keeps track of what dialogs are currently valid), then this issue does not affect you. If you use chan pisip instead of chan sip, then this issue does not affect you.

Resolution

chan_sip has been patched to only treat spaces and horizontal tabs as whitespace following a header name. This allows for Asterisk and authenticating proxies to view requests the same way

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| | Affected Versions | | |
|----------------------|-------------------|--------------|--|
| Product | Release Series | | |
| Asterisk Open Source | 11.x | All Releases | |
| Asterisk Open Source | 13.x | All Releases | |
| Asterisk Open Source | 14.x | All Releases | |
| Certified Asterisk | 13.8 | All Releases | |

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| Product | Release |
| Asterisk Open Source | 11.25.1, 13.13.1, 14.2.1 |
| Certified Asterisk | 11.6-cert16, 13.8-cert4 |

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| SVN URL | Revision |
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Asterisk Project Security Advisories are posted at http://www.asterisk.org/security This document may be superseded by later versions; if so, the latest version will be posted at http://downloads.digium.com/pub/security/ASTERISK-2016-009.pdf and http://downloads.digium.com/pub/security/ASTERISK-2016-009.html

| Revision History | | | |
|----------------------|----------------|---------------------------|--|
| Date | Editor | Revisions Made | |
| November 28, 2016 | Mark Michelson | Initial writeup | |
| December 13, 2016 | Kevin Harwell | Added description and CVE | |